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Abstract
Background: Although domestic HIV/AIDS financing is increasing, international HIV/AIDS financing has plateaued.
Providing incentives for the health system (i.e. performance-based financing [PBF]) may help countries achieve
more with available resources. We systematically reviewed effects of PBF on HIV/AIDS service delivery to inform
WHO guidelines.
Methods: PubMed, WHO Index Medicus, conference databases, and clinical trial registries were searched in April
2015 for randomised trials, comparative contemporaneous studies, or time-series studies. Studies evaluating PBF in
people with HIV were included when they reported service quality, access, or cost. Meta-analyses were not possible
due to limited data. This study is registered with PROSPERO, number CRD42015023207.
Results: Four studies, published from 2009 to 2015 and including 173,262 people, met the eligibility criteria. All
studies were from Sub-Saharan Africa. PBF did not improve individual testing coverage (relative risk [RR], 1.00, 95%
confidence interval [CI] 0.89 to 1.13), improved couples testing coverage (RR 1.11, 95% CI 1.02 to 1.20), and
improved pregnant women testing coverage (RR 1.29, 95% CI 1.28-1.30). PBF improved coverage of antiretrovirals in
pregnant women (RR 1.55, 95% CI 1.50 to 1.59), infants (RR 1.92, 95% CI 1.84 to 2.01), and adults (RR 1.74, 1.64 to 1.85).
PBF reduced attrition (RR 0.84, 95% CI 0.74 to 0.96) and treatment failure (odds ratio 0.55, 95% CI 0.32 to 0.97). Potential
harms were not reported.
Conclusions: Although the limited data suggests PBF positively affected HIV service access and quality, critical health
system and governance knowledge gaps remain. More research is needed to inform national policymaking.
Keywords: Universal health coverage, Health financing, HIV, AIDS, Service, HIV testing, HIV treatment, Antiretroviral
therapy, Quality, Access, Efficiency
Background
Political commitment, social mobilisation, and funding
have increased rapidly since the 2001 global declaration
to address HIV/AIDS [1]. This has translated into sub-
stantial progress in controlling the epidemic, including
meeting the United Nations General Assembly target of
expanding access to antiretroviral therapy (ART) to over
15 million people in 2015 [2]. This scale-up has helped
avert 7.6 million deaths, thereby gaining 40.2 million
life-years [3]. Scale-up of combination prevention, including
ART, also contributed to the 30 million HIV infections
averted since 2000 [2]. Although these achievements are
impressive, HIV remains a leading cause of death and dis-
ability globally [4]. In 2014, there were an estimated 2.0
million new HIV infections, 1.2 million AIDS deaths, and
36.9 million people living with HIV [2]. Moreover, although
domestic HIV/AIDS financing is increasing, international
financing to control the epidemic has plateaued since 2011
[2]. Innovative health systems approaches may help coun-
tries achieve the new global target to end the HIV/AIDS
epidemic by 2030 with the same resources or less [5].
* Correspondence: amitabh.suthar@gmail.com
1Department of HIV/AIDS, World Health Organization, 20 Avenue Appia,
CH-1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© The Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Suthar et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2017) 17:6 
DOI 10.1186/s12913-016-1962-9
Universal health coverage, i.e. ensuring all people obtain
the health services they need without suffering financial
hardship, has emerged as the health system foundation for
the post-2015 global strategy for HIV, viral hepatitis, and
sexually transmitted infections [6]. Essential elements of
universal health coverage include health financing, essen-
tial medicines and health products, national health pol-
icies, health workforce, health statistics and information
systems, and service delivery [7]. Health financing con-
siders how funds are mobilised, pooled, and invested
within health systems [8, 9]. For example, in some low-
and middle-income countries, HIV/AIDS funds could
be mobilised from tax revenue, social health insurance,
the Global Fund (GFATM), and/or the United States
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).
These domestic and external funds are sometimes pooled
within national programmes and then invested into ser-
vices, medicines, and diagnostics needed for epidemic
control. Traditionally, governments use input-based finan-
cing (IBF), wherein commodity, infrastructure, and human
resource need is forecasted, to inform budgeting within
national strategic plans. In recent years, financial incen-
tives have been introduced in some countries to improve
service delivery [10]. There is a wide range of terminology
used for financial incentives [10]. Results-based financing
broadly considers the use of incentives for clients or the
health system [10]. Conditional cash transfers generally
consider the use of financial incentives to clients for cer-
tain behaviours [11, 12]. For example, studies have pro-
vided conditional cash transfers for changes in sexual
behaviour, receiving HIV testing, linking to care, and
achieving viral suppression [13–15]. Performance-based
financing (PBF) predominantly provides financial incen-
tives for the health system based on the quantity and qual-
ity of health services [10].
PBF has been implemented in a number of countries
with potential increases in service coverage, quality of
care, and financial efficiency [16–21]. However, PBF could
also skew focus and priorities to incentivised targets at the
expense of other essential services [22]. Previous system-
atic reviews have evaluated PBF in a range of geographic
contexts and disease programmes [23–25]. Since this
time, evidence has emerged on PBF for HIV/AIDS
service delivery within a health systems framework. We
systematically reviewed this evidence to inform the
development of the 2016 World Health Organization
Consolidated Guidelines on the Use of Antiretroviral
Drugs for Treating and Preventing HIV Infection [26].
Methods
Conduct
The systematic review was conducted in accordance with
the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Review and
Meta-Analysis (PRISMA) statement using a pre-defined
protocol (International Prospective Register of Sys-
tematic Reviews [PROSPERO] identification number:
CRD42015023207) [27, 28]. The PubMed and WHO
Index Medicus databases were systematically searched
without language, publication, date, or any other limits
(Additional file 1: Text S1). Databases from the Inter-
national AIDS Society, Conference on Retroviruses
and Opportunistic Infections, and HIV/AIDS Imple-
menters’ Meeting were also searched. The WHO Inter-
national Clinical Trials Registry Platform, the Cochrane
Central Register of Controlled Trials, the International
Standard Randomised Controlled Trial Number Register,
and ClinicalTrials.gov were searched for future and on-
going studies. Experts in the field were contacted to iden-
tify unpublished research and on-going studies.
Eligibility criteria
Per recommendations from the PRISMA group, eligibility
criteria were based on key study characteristics: population,
intervention, comparator, outcome, and design [27]. Specif-
ically, studies were included when (1) the study population
was composed of infants, children, adolescents, or adults
with HIV in low- and middle-income countries; (2) the
intervention was performance-based financing (i.e. any
program that rewards the health system for delivery of one
or more outputs or outcomes by one or more incentives,
financial or otherwise, upon verification that the agreed-
upon result has actually been delivered [10, 29]); (3) the
comparator was no performance-based financing; (4) the
outcomes were quality (including retention, viral suppres-
sion, adherence to national standard of care, patient satis-
faction, patient centeredness), access (including HIV
testing uptake and coverage, linkage to HIV care, treatment
uptake, or treatment coverage), cost of HIV services, or
harm; and (5) the study design was a randomised trial,
comparative contemporaneous study, or time series study.
Articles focusing on incentives for clients of HIV services
were not included.
Study screening and extraction
ABS and JMN independently screened abstracts of all
identified articles and then matched the full texts of all
articles selected during screening against the inclusion
criteria. Studies meeting the inclusion criteria were in-
cluded in the review and their references were searched
for relevant studies. ABS and JMN completed the data ex-
traction of eligible studies of study participants, methods,
outcomes and quality assessment using a standardised
spread-sheet. Disagreements in study screening and ex-
traction were resolved by discussion.
Statistical analyses
Relative risks were used to calculate effect sizes (Additional
file 2: Text S2) [30]. When reported, study estimates from
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multivariable analyses were included. Given that no out-
come was reported in more than one study in the same
population, it was not possible to conduct meta-analyses.
Quality assessment
For the quality assessment, studies were stratified based
on study design (i.e. randomised controlled trial or ob-
servational study). Per recommendations from the
Cochrane Collaboration, the Collaboration’s ‘Risk of bias’
tool was used to assess bias in randomised trials [31].
This tool rates studies based on four sources of bias:
selection bias, performance and detection bias, attrition
bias and reporting bias. Per recommendations from the
Cochrane Collaboration [31], the Newcastle-Ottawa
Quality Assessment Scale was adapted to assess bias in
observational studies [32]. This scale rates studies based
on criteria in three sources of bias: selection bias, con-
founding and measurement bias.
Results
2047 unique citations were identified through the databases
searches. After screening all titles, 1588 citations were
excluded. After screening the remaining 459 abstracts, 379
abstracts were excluded. 80 full texts were examined for
eligibility, and 76 were excluded. Four studies, published
from 2009 to 2015 and including 173,262 participants, met
the eligibility criteria (Table and Fig. 1). One study was a
cluster randomised trial [33] while the other three articles
were observational studies [34–36]. Two studies were
from Cote d’Ivoire, one study was from Rwanda, and
one study was from Kenya (Table 1). The clinical trial
registers identified two on-going trials: one in Zambia
and one in Zimbabwe [37, 38].
Three studies reported on access to HIV services
(Fig. 2) [33, 34, 36]. One study was randomised and the
others were observational (Table 1). Two studies were in
Cote d’Ivoire while the other was in Rwanda (Table 1).
The average duration of studies was 1.6 years (Table 1).
The cluster randomised trial did not report sequence
generation and allocation concealment [33] (Additional
file 3: Table S1). Two of the observational studies did
not control for confounding [34, 36] and one did not re-
port losses to follow-up [27] (Additional file 4: Table S2).
Although there was no change in individual testing
coverage (relative risk [RR], 1.00, 95% confidence inter-
val [CI] 0.89 to 1.13), there was an improvement in
couples testing coverage (RR 1.11, 95% CI 1.02 to 1.20)
[33]. There was also an observed increase in pregnant
Fig. 1 Study selection
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women testing coverage (RR 1.29, 95% CI 1.28-1.30)
[34]. There were observed improvements in coverage of
antiretrovirals for preventing mother-to-child transmis-
sion in pregnant women (RR 1.55, 95% CI 1.50 to 1.59)
and infants (RR 1.92, 95% CI 1.84 to 2.01) [37]. There
was also an observed improvement in adult ART cover-
age (RR 1.74, 1.64 to 1.85) [36].
Two studies reported on quality of HIV services (Fig. 2)
[35, 36]. Both studies were observational (Table 1). One
study was in Cote d’Ivoire while the other was in
Rwanda (Table 1). The average duration of the studies
was 1.4 years (Table 1). Neither of the studies reported
losses to follow-up and one did not adjust for confound-
ing (Additional file 4: Table S2). PBF was associated with
a reduction in patient attrition (RR 0.84, 95% CI 0.74 to
0.96) [36] and a reduction in rates of treatment failure
(odds ratio 0.55, 95% CI 0.32 to 0.97) [35].
Three studies described their performance-based finan-
cing schemes (Table 2) [33, 34, 36]. PBF was provided for
HIV testing, adult treatment and care, paediatric treatment
and care, and prevention of mother-to-child transmission.
Paediatric treatment and care was incentivised at rates
higher than other populations. One study described how
the scheme was monitored; health facilities were required
to submit monthly reports and quarterly requests for pay-
ment to district committees responsible for verifying the
quality of the data and authorising payment [33]. The com-
mittees verified that the data reported were the same as
what was recorded in facility records during unannounced
quarterly visits. There was no description of whether inde-
pendent third parties were involved in verification of data.
The cost of the monitoring component of PBF was not
reported in any of the studies. Estimates were not available
on the overall comparative cost of PBF to IBF.
Discussion
Cumulatively, the body of evidence suggested that PBF
could have a role for the prevention of mother-to-child
transmission cascade by improving coverage of testing in
pregnant women, couples testing, and antiretrovirals in
Fig. 2 Effects of PBF on HIV service access and quality. *Adjusted odds ratio rather than relative risk presented. Treatment failure defined as CD4
persistently below 100 cells/mm3 after 6–12 months of ART, CD4 falls by ≥50% from on treatment peak value, and/or CD4 falls to or below pre-ART level
Table 2 Performance-based financing service indicators and
unit payments [33, 34, 36]
Service Rwanda
(2006 US$)
Côte d’Ivoire
(2007 US$)
HIV testing and counselling
Number of clients tested for HIV 0.92 3
Number of couples/partners tested 4.59 7.5
Number of children of HIV+ parents tested - 7.5
Adult treatment and care
Number of HIV+ patients who received
CD4 test
4.59 -
Number of new HIV+ adults on ART 4.59 7.5
Number of HIV+ patients on
co-trimoxazole prophylaxis
0.46 -
Number of HIV+ patients screened
for tuberculosis
2.75 -
Number of facility visits (eligibility,
15 days, 1 month, 3 months,
9 months, 12 months, unplanned)
- 3-7.5
Number of facility visits for ART-ineligible
patients (quarterly)
- 6
Paediatric treatment and care
Number of new children living with
HIV on ART
- 11.25
Number of facility visits (eligibility,
15 days, 1 month, 3 months, 9 months,
12 months, unplanned)
- 4.5-11.25
Number of facility visits for ART-ineligible
patients (quarterly)
- 9
Prevention of mother-to-child transmission
Births at health facility - 6
Number Postnatal visits - 3
Number of infants born to HIV+
mothers tested
9.17 -
Number of HIV+ women on contraception 2.75 -
Number of HIV+ pregnant women on
ART during labour
4.59 -
Number of new HIV-infected infants
on ART
6.88 -
The US$ figures represent an individual service unit
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the pregnant women and their infants. There was also
potential for PBF to improve ART coverage, retention,
and adherence in adults. However, many health system
and governance knowledge gaps were identified. For
example, there were no data on potential harms associated
with PBF or on spill-over effects on overall health system
performance. Also, all data were generated in generalised
epidemics. We have formulated the critical knowledge
gaps identified into research priorities (Table 3).
PBF was associated with improved quality of care by
reducing rates of attrition and treatment failure. Since
some interventions have shown promise in reducing
rates of treatment failure in individual studies but did
not replicate their results in other studies, the PBF
results require further examination and validation in
other geographic contexts [39]. Risk factors for patient
attrition have been related to access, acceptability, and
affordability of services [26]. Studies evaluating inter-
ventions to improve access and affordability have
consistently shown favourable outcomes [40]. It is
possible that PBF’s positive effects on attrition are
related to making provider behaviour more acceptable
to clients and thereby improving patient satisfaction
and utilisation of HIV services. This means PBF could
complement interventions that improve access and
affordability of HIV services [41].
PBF was shown to improve access to HIV services. This
is consistent with results from other disease programmes
[16, 18, 20]. However, if health workforce remuneration is
based primarily on specific indicators selected for HIV
PBF, it is possible that other health indicators not based
on performance may get de-prioritised. This could lead to
health sector inequities wherein incentivised HIV services
are given increased attention relative to non-incentivised
services for HIV and other diseases. To prevent this, some
publicly financed PBF initiatives include indicators for
many diseases [20]. This approach would make PBF a
wider health financing reform and may lead to im-
proved institutionalisation and larger returns on health
investments [42]. Consideration could also be made to
evaluate use of PBF across different ministries as overall
government reform.
The evidence on costing was limited to the PBF
schemes used in studies. It is difficult to directly com-
pare the PBF schemes used in studies due to potential
economic and health system differences across countries.
For example, it is possible that facilities in Cote d’Ivoire
had larger incentives than facilities in Rwanda for the
same indicators due to differences in health workforce
remuneration or national guideline laboratory reagent
requirements. Nonetheless, the funds allocated per indi-
cator seemed to depend on a number of criteria includ-
ing priority within the health sector, complexity of the
task, and the required health commodities and staff time
[43]. Moreover, although the PBF schemes described the
service being incentivised, there was no description of
other operational costs associated with implementing
PBF. For example, if personnel are required to oversee
the scheme and ensure quality data are being reported
for reimbursement, this may require additional financial
and human resources [44]. Before national implementa-
tion, it would be necessary to understand the overall
resource requirements of PBF to IBF. If PBF requires
substantially more resources than IBF, other potentially
more cost-effective and sustainable options to improve
service access and quality could be explored.
The identified studies used external grants for PBF
and were relatively short in duration. External funds
may not be subject to the same regulations and restric-
tions as domestic funds. For example, using PBF for
domestic funds likely has regulatory and procedural im-
plications that extend beyond the Ministry of Health
[45]. In order to ensure sustainability of PBF within
HIV/AIDS programmes, issues surrounding the transfer-
ring of domestic funds should be reviewed prior to
implementing PBF. The short duration of studies also
mean that it is unknown whether the effects wane or
improve over time. For example, workforce behaviour
change could wane over time as they eventually ex-
pected the bonus to be a part of their normal salary.
Table 3 Possible performance-based financing research priorities
Category Research priority
Service delivery 1) Evaluate effect size over longer periods of time
2) Evaluate effects on non-incentivised services
and the broader health system
3) Evaluate effects of stopping PBF
4) Identify specific services for which PBF is effective
5) Validate results in different geographic settings
Human resources 6) Quantify and compare human resources required
for implementing and monitoring PBF and IBF
7) Evaluate effects on health workforce behaviour,
including absenteeism, task sharing, and
productivity
Governance 8) Evaluate effectiveness of PBF as vertical approach
within the HIV/AIDS programme versus as part of
overall health system
9) Identify potential health system mechanisms
through which PBF may be effective
Health financing 10) Quantify and compare overall cost, including
schemes and oversight, of PBF and IBF
Information systems 11) Evaluate effects on the quality, accuracy,
completeness, timeliness, and use of data
at health facilities
12) Evaluate the role of communities and PLHIV
organisations in validating performance
Clients 13) Evaluate and compare acceptability of PBF
and IBF services
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Moreover, no studies evaluated the effects of withdraw-
ing PBF schemes on service quality and access. This is a
research priority as it is possible that stopping PBF
schemes could cause previously incentivised services to
have levels of quality or access that were even lower
than baseline due to newly found expectations from
health system staff.
Implementing PBF requires a number of health system
actions [10]. First, indicators to include the PBF scheme
must be identified and agreed upon. The selection of
indicators to be incentivised should be based on pre-
agreed criteria, including being patient-centred, to pre-
vent potential harm [46]. Selection of indicators that do
not always benefit the patient could result in undesired
health system behaviour. For example, in relation to
preventing mother-to-child transmission of HIV, if the
number of caesarean sections is reimbursed based on
performance, it is possible that providers could provide
caesarean sections to women who do not need them.
Second, facilities must further develop their budget
management and administration skills. For example,
currently many districts have to report quantities of
commodities that they have forecasted in order to re-
ceive central government funds. With PBF, facilities
would have to become more autonomous in a sense by
managing and disbursing the funds for health staff, com-
modities, and infrastructure at the local level. Third, in
order to prevent undesired behaviour, an oversight sys-
tem must be put in place to ensure the robustness and
quality of the PBF data and services being reported.
PBF’s effects on health information systems were not
reported in any of the studies. Often, lower tiers of the
health system collect, analyse, and interpret data mostly
for reporting purposes [47]. With PBF, health staff are
incentivised to carefully collect, analyse, and interpret fa-
cility-level data. This incentive may help develop informa-
tion system capacities within the workforce. This capacity
development may lead health staff to understand, interpret
and act upon other routinely collected programme data
(including those for non-incentivised services). Therefore,
PBF could improve completeness, accuracy, timeliness,
and use of health data. This could also improve procure-
ment and supply chain management systems by improving
the capacity of health facilities to forecast commodity
needs. These potential spill-over effects on the health sys-
tem require further examination.
The studies did not fully describe the mechanisms
through which PBF may have been effective. More re-
search could explain how PBF affects staff behaviour. For
example, it was hypothesised that PBF works primarily by
motivating existing healthcare staff to work harder and
more efficiently and thereby improve productivity; how-
ever, some settings may already have healthcare staff that
are working their hardest and as efficiently as their facility
allows [48]. It was also hypothesised that PBF could make
health workforce salaries more competitive, but some
settings may already compensate health workforce with
competitive salaries [49]. In these situations, PBF may not
provide additional benefits. Moreover, many healthcare
staff may have been intrinsically motivated to provide care
to members of their community. It is unknown
whether PBF changes their motivation to be more ex-
trinsic. Therefore, thorough baseline situation analyses
of health workforce productivity and remuneration
would help countries in considering possible benefits
and harms of implementing PBF [50].
The studies did not describe secondary effects of PBF.
For example, PBF may be a mechanism to increase ac-
countability for PBF services across different tiers of the
health system. This relates closely to the performance
contracts that are used within PBF schemes. Although
not reported in the identified studies, some national or
local governments assign minimum levels of services
that must be provided by health facilities. Remuneration
in PBF schemes may only start after this minimum level
of services has been provided. For example, health facil-
ities may be assigned to test a minimum of 20 people for
HIV every month. If this minimum threshold is not met,
the health facility is not eligible for PBF because it has
failed to achieve its assigned duties. Therefore, PBF could
help ensure providers are accountable for providing the
minimum level of services assigned by the government.
This systematic review identified studies evaluating the
effects of PBF on the quality, access, and cost of HIV
service delivery. It is possible that non-financial incentives,
i.e. gifts, could affect healthcare staff behaviour in a more
cost-effective manner [51]. Gifts could also prevent the
development of hierarchical relationships between funders
and recipients and undesired effects on intrinsic staff
motivation. Given our focus on performance-based finan-
cing, we did not include articles including client-based
incentives in this systematic review due to potential differ-
ences in health system implementation, financial resource
requirements, and impact. We encourage thorough evalu-
ation and publication of results-based financing initiatives
that include incentives for both the health system and
clients to inform policy and practice [52].
There are some methodological limitations that need
to be considered when evaluating this evidence-base.
One of the main limitations of this body of literature
was that it was primarily observational in nature. Obser-
vational data are susceptible to confounders which could
affect our confidence in the effect size. For example, the
positive effects of PBF observed in the studies may have
been due to more experienced health workforce in PBF
facilities, higher salaries at PBF facilities, or more funds
for HIV services at PBF facilities. In particular, the
results of uncontrolled before-after studies should be
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interpreted with caution due to difficulties in attributing
causality to PBF with this study design [53]. There were
also concerns related to allocation concealment and
sequence generation with the cluster-randomised trial.
Finally, design of PBF evaluations requires careful plan-
ning and discussion among relevant stakeholders. Dur-
ing this systematic review several PBF evaluations were
identified that were excluded because events without a
denominator were reported. For example, rather than
reporting coverage, the number of units of service
administered in PBF facilities compared to non-PBF
facilities were reported in some studies [54, 55]. Since
the number of people eligible for these services may be
higher in PBF facilities versus non-PBF facilities, or vice
versa, it is difficult to draw any conclusion from these
data. Finally, the scope of this review was limited to
services covered in the 2016 World Health Organization
Consolidated Guidelines on the Use of Antiretroviral
Drugs for Treating and Preventing HIV Infection [26];
further research and synthesis is needed to evaluate the
effects of PBF on the effectiveness of HIV counselling
and education.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the limited data available suggest possible
benefits of PBF for expanding access to quality HIV
services; however, critical health system and governance
knowledge gaps remain. Moreover, the long term sus-
tainability of PBF in the absence of external funds is
unknown. Data filling these gaps are needed to inform
national policy makers.
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